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If phrónêsis does not develop and define virtue as its own deliberative goal — what does?

Labyrinth

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Title If phrónêsis does not develop and define virtue as its own deliberative goal — what does?
 
Creator Eikeland, Olav
 
Subject Philosophy
Aristotle, deliberation, dialectics, habit, imagination, phrónêsis, virtue
 
Description The article discusses relationships and contexts for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland (2008). It positions Eikeland (2008) in relation to Moss (2011, 2012, 2014) but with a side view to Cammick (2013), Kristjansson (2014), and Taylor (2016). These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phrónêsis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical.
 
Publisher Axia Academic Publishers
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2016-12-30
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
Philosophic-Historical Approach
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.axiapublishers.com/ojs/index.php/labyrinth/article/view/46
10.25180/lj.v18i2.46
 
Source Labyrinth; Vol 18, No 2 (2016): Praxis, Virtues, and Values: The Legacies of Aristotle; 27-49
1561-8927
2410-4817
10.25180/lj.v18i2
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.axiapublishers.com/ojs/index.php/labyrinth/article/view/46/50
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201706098373
 
Coverage Greek Philosophy
Ancient Philosophy
—
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2016 Olav Eikeland
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0